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The recent scandal surrounding Russian state-sponsored doping highlighted deep rooted issues
aﬀecting international anti-doping procedures in sport. Slobodan Tomic argues that the key
problem lies in the failure of the current anti-doping regime’s institutional design to specify
hierarchies of accountability. To match powers with responsibilities, he suggests that we should
avoid framing the reform as a debate over the role of one stakeholder – the World Anti-Doping
Agency (WADA) – and instead consider the wider picture, while clearly deﬁning the role played by
individual states.
Marija Savinova, golden medallist in the Women 800m in London 2012 (here captured with
bronze medallist Ekaterina Poistogova) – one of Russia’s most prominent athletes accused
of doping. Credits: Tab59 (CC BY-SA 2.0)
The discovery of a state-sponsored doping scheme for Russian athletes, and the controversy surrounding the use of
Therapeutic Use Exemptions by athletes, are simply the latest scandals that have precipitated talk of reforming the
system for tackling doping across world sport, and of reforming its chief regulator, the World Anti-Doping Agency
(WADA). The ongoing debate over the issue regularly includes exchanges assigning blame for recent scandals, as
well as a multitude of ideas for improving the present system, but the question of the accountability architecture of
the anti-doping regime has barely been raised.
Talks of future reform have included the possibility of replacing WADA with another body, within or outside the
International Olympic Committee (IOC). However, several questions are still outstanding: would this new body need
additional powers? How would resources be increased to support the inspection of athletes? Furthermore, WADA is
not the sole, but only one in a multitude of stakeholders in the international anti-doping regime, as illustrated in Table
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1 below.
Table 1: Network of stakeholders in the anti-doping regime
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Source: Adopted from WADA’s website. Table compiled by the author.
Since the state does not represent the (sole) locus of authority and the stakeholders’ relationships are fragmented
and interdependent, this regime is a polycentric one. As such, it suﬀers from inherent coordination diﬃculties, with
serious enforcement as well as legitimacy challenges. Yet, despite these ‘inherent’ diﬃculties, the key problem in
the current anti-doping regime lies in the failure of its institutional design to specify the accountability hierarchies
among stakeholders. In short, as highlighted in an oft-cited paper, who is to be held to account in the pursuit of anti-
doping policies, to whom, for what, by what standards, and with what eﬀects?
Should governments, who fund WADA with a 50% contribution, hold the latter to account for the outcomes of anti-
doping policy, or should it be the IOC, which initiated the creation of WADA in 1999 and which provides the other
50% of WADA’s budget? Or should this be an ’umbrella’ international organisation such as UNESCO or similar?
Should WADA be held accountable at all for those failures that are beyond its powers and control? Regrettably, the
legislation deﬁning the institutional design of the anti-doping regime is silent on such issues.
Moreover, the absence of clear accountability arrangements has left the door open for turf battles over the role of the
principal among stakeholders. WADA’s eﬀorts have clearly been to establish itself as the main locus of authority in
the anti-doping world, whereas the rhetoric and actions of other stakeholders, such as the IOC, demonstrate a
similar intention which would then render WADA’s position ‘sub-ordinate’. National governments, on the other hand,
have not made such pledges so far, but their role should not be dismissed given the history of major interventions of
national oﬃcials in previous crises in the anti-doping world (for example, during the creation of WADA in 1999).
While skilled ‘turf battling’ may increase an actor’s legitimacy to claim de-facto leadership, under a high degree of
polycentrism this can increase the gap between the real regulatory possibilities and the perceived duty to solve
problems that arise. Consider the range of international and domestic stakeholders in all three phases of the
regulatory process – in standard-setting, in data collection, and in enforcement –  that WADA is dependent upon
(Table 2).
Table 2: WADA’s interdependencies across the regulatory cycle
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Note: The three stages are adopted from Hood et al. Information gathering mostly consists of
collecting and testing urine and blood samples. Human intelligence gathering is a much
smaller component, although growing in importance. Table compiled by the author.
Whereas the low rate of positive tests of athletes (often around 1%) suggests a failure in the anti-doping system, it
should not be forgotten that implementing an anti-doping system is highly complex. It unfolds across national
territories, athletes provide ‘whereabouts’ information for out of competition tests, conducted without notice; samples
have to be safely transported and tested, then sanctions imposed in the event of an adverse ﬁnding.
The whole process is subject to appeal both within the rules of the commissioning organisation and then at CAS.
Conﬂicts of interest are inherent in the system: an IF or an NOC makes important decisions about who and when to
test, and what sanctions to impose, but it is not in their interests for their biggest stars to test positive and be
suspended from major championships (independent anti-doping processes are yet to be developed). It is clear then
that WADA has neither the powers, nor the resources, to eﬀectively drive such a process.
Yet, having portrayed, and probably having established itself over the previous period as the major stakeholder,
WADA has become the prime addressee in analyses of the troubling state of anti-doping. Despite general support
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for the continuation of its work, the impression is also that a wider public ﬁnds WADA responsible for the status quo
as well as future action in tackling doping. Others, such as individual IOC members, have pushed this notion further,
pointing to WADA as the main culprit for the anti-doping regime breakdown. However, these perceived
accountabilities are not grounded in the formal design but result from non-formalised stakeholders’ day-to-day
muddling through.
Instead of framing the question of reforms as a debate over one stakeholder, further discussion of reforms would
beneﬁt from considering the wider picture of the anti-doping regime. The roles and expectations of all stakeholders
need to be speciﬁed, and appropriate accountability arrangements assigned. This would include deﬁning the role of
the state in the transnational anti-doping regime, international organisations’ roles, and scope for action of the other
stakeholders such as WADA and the IOC. It would then be possible to match the powers with responsibilities for the
overall anti-doping regime (and parts of it).
Interdependences, inherent to polycentric regimes, will by no means disappear, but they will become more
manageable. Having clearer lines of responsibility and stakeholders’ roles can improve mutual collaboration and
reduce the scope for blame-games, dispelling much of the current unease within the anti-doping world.
Please read our comments policy before commenting .
Note: This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of EUROPP – European Politics and Policy, nor
of the London School of Economics.
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